Originally published by Tax Justice Network Africa here.

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03 August 2026, New York  

Objectives (Art. 1) and Principles (Art. 2) 

The Objectives and Principles of the Framework Convention were considered in the 1st meeting held on 3 August 2026.  

Africa Group’s position on the objectives and principles 

Overall, the African Group (AG) strongly supported retaining Articles 1 and 2 as currently drafted, arguing that they faithfully reflect the agreed Terms of Reference (ToR) for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (Resolution 79/235) adopted by the UN General Assembly. Specifically on Article 1, Zambia intervened on behalf of the Africa Group. It first reiterated the need for the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to make substantial progress on the Articles of the Framework Convention. It supported the text of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention and submitted that the objectives of the Convention should reflect those set out in the ToRs. It rejected the proposals for complementarity, stating that this article could not address the Convention’s relationship with other agreements. On the issue of complementarity, it noted that Article 21 of the Framework Convention addresses its relationship with other agreements, instruments, and domestic law. In addition, they were of the view that the Objectives and Principles of the Convention could not be in the Preamble to the Convention. 

Following this intervention, the following were the key positions further articulated by the African Group and supported by other Member States:  

1. Article 1 should adhere to the ToR 

Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso supported the Africa Group position. They were of the view that the ToR, which set out the objectives, had already been negotiated under Resolution 79/235, and there was no need to reopen the discussion on the objectives at this advanced stage of drafting the Framework Convention. Senegal emphasised that not a single comma had been changed from the ToR. India, Russia, Brazil, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia supported the Africa Group Position.  

2. The ToR is the negotiating mandate 

In support of the Africa Group, Nigeria submitted that any changes to Articles 1 and 2 would effectively constitute an amendment to the INC mandate. These Articles were essentially the guide or constitution of the Framework Convention.  

3. Relationship with other agreements should be addressed in Article 21 of the Convention 

There was an acknowledgement of the importance of understanding the relationship of the Framework Convention with bilateral tax treaties, OECD instruments, and other existing agreements. However, this was already dealt with under Article 21. This was repeatedly mentioned by Zambia, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal.  

4. The need for focused objectives 

They emphasised that issues related to legal certainty, sovereignty, interaction with treaties, and complementarity should be addressed in other Articles of the Framework Convention rather than in Articles 1 and 2, reiterating that the current objectives, as drafted, were sufficiently concise. 

5. Objectives and Principles should remain separate from the preamble 

There was strong opposition to the proposal to place Articles 1 and 2 in the preamble of the Framework Convention. This opposition came from Zambia, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire. They submitted that the purpose of the preamble to the Framework Convention was to provide context, while Article 1 establishes legal objectives. 

What are the diverging views from other Member States?  

Ireland, on behalf of the member states of the European Union, proposed to have Articles 1 and 2 strengthened. Their key proposals were that: 1) there was a need to ensure consistency with existing international tax architecture; 2) the Convention should complement rather than replace existing agreements; 3) there was a need to improve legal certainty; and 4) there needs to be assurance that obligations under existing treaties are unaffected unless Parties agree otherwise. Japan supported this proposal, specifically the call for an explicit reference to existing international frameworks. The Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Austria, Germany, and France also supported this proposal, which called for improving the current legal system rather than an overhaul. Germany’s position was that Article 1, in its current state, was too broad. Mexico took a more nuanced position. It accepted that Article 1 reflects the ToR but argued that principles can legitimately overlap with substantive provisions, that complementarity should also appear as a guiding principle, and that Article 21 alone may not be sufficient to address the relationship with other instruments. 

Indonesia proposed strengthening Article 2 by introducing an explicit principle of fair allocation of taxing rights, reflecting modern economic realities and addressing challenges posed by the digital economy. Azerbaijan expressed similar views. Indonesia, India, and Azerbaijan argued that Article 2 should expressly recognise different national capacities, policy space, flexibility for developing countries, and proportionate implementation.  

Many delegations proposed making sovereignty an explicit principle. Countries included Colombia, Belgium, Sweden, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Czechia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. The common arguments were that tax sovereignty should be expressly protected, similar provisions exist in other UN conventions, and sovereignty should guide the interpretation of the Convention. Belgium specifically proposed a separate article on sovereignty. 

Conclusion   

The African Group viewed Article 1 and 2 as a direct restatement of the agreed UN General Assembly mandate in the ToR. They argued that adding references to complementarity, existing treaties, or sovereignty would reopen settled negotiations and dilute the mandate. The EU and other Member States accepted the objectives but sought explicit reassurance that the Framework Convention would operate alongside existing international tax instruments, avoid duplication, preserve legal certainty, and respect state sovereignty. They considered these elements to be important interpretative guidance that should appear in Article 1 rather than be left solely to later provisions. However, other Member States sought to have the objectives of the Framework Convention in the Preamble. The Africa Group opposed this proposal, maintaining that the objectives established the legal objectives that served as a guide to the INC. 

Sustainable Development (Art.4)  

The 1st meeting also considered the article on sustainable development. The main divergence was whether the article should remain a high-level provision or be expanded to include more explicit references to environmental sustainability, human rights, progressive taxation, and domestic resource mobilisation (DRM). 

Africa Group’s position on sustainable development?  

The African Group supported retaining Article 4 substantially as drafted, considering it to be balanced, comprehensive and consistent with the agreed ToR. While African countries indicated they would review written proposals, they did not support expanding the article during the negotiations. Saudi Arabia and China supported the Article remaining unchanged.  

1. Article 4 reflects the agreed balance 

African countries argued that the current text appropriately balances the three pillars of sustainable development: economic development, social development, and environmental sustainability. Zambia and Nigeria proposed that Article 4 already captures the essential elements of sustainable development and should remain unchanged. 

2. The article already accommodates different national capacities 

Zambia highlighted that the opening paragraph already recognises the differing capacities of States Parties and the importance of DRM. Accordingly, additional language was considered unnecessary. 

3. No need to expand the environmental dimension 

Although several countries proposed strengthening the environmental language, the African Group considered that the environmental, economic, and social dimensions were already adequately reflected. Nigeria specifically noted that the proposals advanced by other delegations could already fit within the three existing dimensions of sustainable development rather than requiring additional text.  

4. Maintain consistency with the Terms of Reference 

The African Union stressed that the draft captures the essence of the ToR and should therefore be maintained without substantive amendment.  

5. Preserve a balanced framework 

African countries preferred to maintain a concise, high-level framework rather than introduce detailed policy prescriptions. 

Diverging views from other Member States?  

Many countries welcomed Article 4 but argued that it should be expanded to better articulate the relationship between taxation and sustainable development. Their proposals generally focused on four themes: 1) stronger links to DRM; 2) environmental sustainability; 3) human rights and inclusion; and 4) policy coherence. 

Jamaica proposed the most significant environmental expansion. It suggested inclusion of: 1) the Sustainable Development principle; 2) Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC); 3) alignment with international environmental treaties; and 4) reference to the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Climate Change. Brazil supported retaining the article but proposed substantial additions, including a stronger link between tax cooperation and DRM; policy coherence with sustainable development, human rights, gender equality, racial equality, and environmental sustainability; CBDR; progressive taxation; and a periodic COP review mechanism. Azerbaijan made similar proposals to Brazil. Mexico also supported an amended Article 4 that included some of Brazil’s proposals, as well as the contribution of fiscal policy to economic and social rights. In addition to the inclusion of sustainable development and human rights, the United Kingdom expressed disappointment that the previous proposals had not been incorporated into the draft text of the Article. It proposed including Financing for Development (FFD4/Sevilla) commitments. India adopted a middle-ground position. It supported expanding the article but cautioned that it should remain high-level; the language should not become prescriptive, and Member States should retain policy space to design their own tax systems. India supported stronger references to DRM, reducing inequalities, and inclusive growth. 

Conclusion  

The principal disagreement concerned the level of detail. The African Group, together with countries such as China and Saudi Arabia, viewed the existing text as a carefully balanced, high-level provision that already reflects the three dimensions of sustainable development and the agreed Terms of Reference. They cautioned against expanding the article unnecessarily. Many developed and several developing countries, including Jamaica, Brazil, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Azerbaijan, supported retaining Article 4 but argued that it should be strengthened through explicit references to DRM, environmental sustainability, climate change, human rights, gender equality, progressive taxation, and policy coherence. They considered these additions necessary to ensure that international tax cooperation more effectively contributes to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. 

For further reading on these topics, please read our blogs: 

The UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation: A Primer and Agenda for Africa

Human rights approaches to the UN Tax Convention

Fair allocation of taxing rights: advancing source-based taxation in Africa

04 August 2026, New York  

Fair Allocation of Taxing Rights (Art. 5) 

In the 1st and 2nd Meetings of the INC, the fair allocation of taxing rights was discussed.  

Africa Group’s Position on Fair Allocation of Taxing Rights  

The Africa Group viewed Article 5 as the core of the Framework Convention, arguing that it should establish robust principles for a fairer allocation of taxing rights and provide clear commitments to implement those principles through domestic measures, protocols, and treaty reform. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

 1. Article 5 is the heart of the Framework Convention 

Zambia made submissions on behalf of the Africa Group. It maintained its previous position that fair allocation of taxing rights was at the core of the negotiations. It submitted that as a result, the article ought to be robust and clear, establishing clear principles on nexus and the allocation of taxing rights. Further, the article was considered important because it was submitted as the foundation of future protocols to the Convention. This was supported by Nigeria.  

2. The current draft has been weakened during multiple revisions of the text  

In their view, the Zero Draft of the Framework Convention had weakened the Article on fair allocation of taxing rights. The Africa Group observed that the revised text of the Article contained weaker language, omitted key elements, and failed to provide sufficiently clear principles for allocating taxing rights. Specifically, Algeria stated that the revised draft had weakened the article by removing the stronger language recognising taxing rights where value is created or economic activities occur, replacing it with weaker references to “economic contribution”, and removing references to treaty renegotiation. As a result, the Convention would no longer serve its intended purpose of correcting existing imbalances affecting developing countries. 

3. Economic activity must remain a central nexus 

The Africa Group, Zambia, Kenya, Senegal, and Algeria supported the position that “economic activity” should be restored in Article 5. They were in support of India’s proposal to have “economic activity” be restored. They considered “economic activity” to be an essential basis for allocating taxing rights. Senegal argued that “real economic contribution” was vague. In comparison, it submitted that “economic activity” is a clearer legal concept for tax purposes.  

4. Nexus factors should be alternative (“or”), not cumulative (“and”) 

The Africa Group opposed wording that would require multiple nexus factors to exist simultaneously. Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Algeria supported replacing “and” with “or”. Their concern was that cumulative nexus requirements would make it much harder for source jurisdictions to establish taxing rights.  

5. Stronger implementation commitments are needed 

The Africa Group criticised the wording in paragraph 2: “States Parties shall explore and pursue…” as too weak. It proposed replacing it with binding commitments requiring States to adopt measures, including domestic legislative reforms, protocols, and renegotiation of tax treaties. The Africa Group indicated that it would provide written input on Article 5, including an additional paragraph outlining these commitments. Nigeria agreed that “shall” should create genuine obligations; “explore and pursue” is too vague; and Article 5 requires mandatory implementation language.  

6. Renegotiation of tax treaties remains essential 

The Africa Group regarded treaty reform as necessary to rebalance taxing rights. Algeria argued that removing treaty renegotiation deprived developing countries of an important mechanism and perpetuated asymmetrical treaty relationships. It therefore proposed restoring commitments relating to treaty renegotiation. 

7. Fair allocation of taxing rights should support sustainable development 

Several Africa countries linked fair allocation directly to domestic resource mobilisation and financing sustainable development. Algeria noted that fair allocation is closely connected to enabling States to mobilise resources for sustainable development. 

8. Future-proof nexus rules 

Africa countries supported retaining flexible nexus concepts that can address evolving business models. Kenya supported including value creation, economic activity, revenue generation, users, and data generation. Kenya proposed referring to where data is generated, rather than merely where it is stored. 

Diverging views from other Member States 

Many developed countries accepted the objective of fair allocation of taxing rights but argued that Article 5 should remain at a high level, avoid creating substantive allocation rules, minimise legal uncertainty, and preserve the balance between source and residence taxation. Germany stated that the Framework Convention should not establish new allocation rules. The United Kingdom expressed concern that the draft Article grants taxing rights to market jurisdictions too broadly, departs from the current international tax system without sufficient qualification, and leaves obligations and interactions with existing treaties unclear. Similarly, Belgium objected to multiple nexus factors, open-ended references to “other factors,” and reduced legal certainty. Luxembourg shared similar concerns. Although Italy accepted the Article on the fair allocation of taxing rights, it argued that detailed nexus rules should be set out in a protocol because the Framework Convention should remain high-level. Austria supported that substantive rules belong in the protocols.  

Norway proposed a more balanced formulation. It suggested equal recognition of source and residence jurisdictions, replacing “shall reflect” with “shall take into account as appropriate”, removing some nexus factors and emphasizing elimination of double taxation. Like the Africa Group, Switzerland supported retaining “economic activity” in the Article but deleting the word “real.” It also supported making the elimination of double taxation the article’s objective.  

Portugal expressed concern that Article 5, together with Articles 21 and 22, could imply mandatory treaty renegotiation. France accepted fair allocation as an objective but argued that there is no common understanding of what it means and that definitions need to be clarified to reach consensus. 

Conclusion  

The Africa Group viewed Article 5 as the substantive foundation of the Framework Convention, intended to rebalance international taxing rights in favour of jurisdictions where economic activity, value creation, revenue generation, users, or data establish a sufficient nexus. Africa countries sought stronger legal obligations, restoration of references to economic activity, alternative nexus criteria (“or” rather than “and”), and commitments to implement these principles through domestic legislation, protocols, and, where necessary, the renegotiation of existing tax treaties. 

Many developed countries accepted the objective of fair allocation but argued that Article 5 should remain a high-level statement of principle. They cautioned that detailed nexus rules, broad source-based taxing rights, and references that could imply treaty renegotiation would create legal uncertainty, upset the balance between source and residence taxation, and should instead be addressed through future protocols or implementing instruments. Various countries broadly aligned with the Africa Group on strengthening source taxing rights, although not necessarily on all implementation proposals. These included India, Brazil, China, Jamaica, and Russia (on certain drafting issues).  

High Net Worth Individuals (Art. 6)  

Africa Group’s position on taxation of High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs)  

The Africa Group strongly supported a more proactive, action-oriented Article 6, arguing that the current draft had been weakened compared to earlier versions. Africa countries called for stronger obligations on States Parties to cooperate in the effective taxation of HNWIs, maintain meaningful exchange of information, and remove unnecessary references to national sovereignty that were already addressed elsewhere in the Convention. Countries supporting this position included Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Morocco, Burkina Faso. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Restore stronger implementation language 

The Africa Group argued that paragraph 1 of the Article had been diluted. Zambia on behalf of the Africa Group argued that replacing “develop and implement” with “cooperate to enhance” weakened the article and reduced the proactive commitment expected from States Parties. The Africa Group, therefore, supported restoring the earlier wording. The current wording, “States Parties shall cooperate to enhance…”, should be replaced with “States Parties shall develop and implement…”. Kenya, Ghana, Morocco and Burkina Faso all supported this position. 

2. Delete the word “general” for exchange of information 

The Africa Group argued that limiting the obligation to share “general information” unnecessarily restricted cooperation. It supported retaining paragraph 2 but deleting the word “general”, arguing that States Parties should make a meaningful commitment to exchange information relating to HNWIs. Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Nigeria echoed this proposal. 

3. Replace “explore” with “adopt” 

Africa countries argued that paragraph 3 should impose a stronger obligation. Instead of: “States Parties shall explore coordinated approaches…” they proposed: “States Parties shall adopt coordinated approaches…” Zambia, Kenya, Morocco and Burkina Faso all supported this amendment. 

4. Delete the reference to national sovereignty 

The Africa Group consistently argued that national sovereignty was already recognised as a guiding principle under Article 2 and therefore should not be repeated in Article 6. Countries supporting deletion included Zambia, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Morocco, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Nigeria further argued that, by entering into an international treaty, States necessarily accept limitations on the exercise of their domestic sovereignty, making repeated references unnecessary.  

5. Maintain exchange of information as a substantive obligation 

Africa countries stressed that exchange of information is one of the principal tools for combating tax avoidance and evasion by HNWIs. Accordingly, they opposed deleting paragraph 2 and instead sought to strengthen it. 

6. Effective taxation of HNWIs is essential for tax justice 

Nigeria emphasised that addressing HNWIs is fundamental to achieving greater progressivity within tax systems. Burkina Faso further linked stronger obligations under Article 6 to the prevention of illicit financial flows. 

Diverging views from other Member States?  

Most other delegations supported the inclusion of Article 6 but differed from the Africa Group on the level of obligation, the role of existing international mechanisms, the treatment of sovereignty, and whether the provision should remain a high-level framework or become more operational. Switzerland welcomed the revised draft, supporting the softer formulation of “cooperate to enhance” rather than “develop and implement,” advocating for reliance on existing exchange-of-information mechanisms, and retaining references to sovereignty, arguing that the Convention should build on mechanisms that already function effectively rather than create parallel systems.  

Germany similarly supported stronger international cooperation while emphasising that existing exchange-of-information mechanisms should remain the primary instruments and that sovereignty should be addressed through a horizontal provision applicable across the Convention rather than only in Article 6. Norway preferred to keep Article 6 a high-level provision, proposing that paragraph 2 refer to existing exchange-of-information mechanisms and avoid unnecessary operational detail. Austria considered paragraph 2 inappropriate for the Framework Convention and proposed its deletion, arguing that such detailed provisions would be better suited to a protocol, while Estonia similarly recommended deleting paragraph 2 on the basis that Article 11 already provides for exchange of information, rendering the provision duplicative. Japan supported defining HNWIs but favoured focusing Article 6 on the exchange of knowledge and best practices rather than creating new exchange-of-information obligations.  

Sweden also argued that the article should remain high-level and concentrate on the exchange of experiences and best practices. Singapore opposed expanding exchange-of-information obligations beyond existing agreements, proposing an explicit reference to “applicable agreements” and suggesting that any definition of HNWIs should be left to future legal instruments rather than the Framework Convention. China supported the objective of taxing HNWIs but stressed that exchange of information must comply with domestic and international legal frameworks and that coordinated approaches should not undermine national sovereignty.  

The Republic of Korea welcomed both stronger cooperation and the explicit reference to sovereignty, arguing that sovereignty is a cross-cutting principle that should remain expressly reflected throughout the Convention. Belgium similarly supported defining HNWIs but considered that sovereignty should either be removed from Article 6 and addressed through a separate horizontal provision or retained consistently across the Convention. Luxembourg maintained that decisions concerning the level and structure of taxation remain matters of national legislation and argued that Article 6 should not create an international mandate over domestic tax systems. 

Conclusion  

The Africa Group viewed Article 6 as a key mechanism for ensuring the effective taxation of high-net-worth individuals. It sought stronger, legally binding obligations requiring States Parties to develop and implement measures, exchange meaningful information, adopt coordinated approaches, and remove redundant references to sovereignty already covered by Article 2.  

Many other delegations, while supporting international cooperation on the taxation of HNWIs, preferred a higher-level framework that builds on existing exchange-of-information mechanisms, preserves flexibility for domestic implementation, and avoids creating detailed operational obligations within the Framework Convention itself. They also differed on whether sovereignty should remain explicitly referenced in Article 6 or be addressed through a separate horizontal provision. 

Tax related illicit financial flows, tax avoidance and tax evasion (including definition of Tax Related IFFs) (Art. 7) 

Africa Group’s position on Tax Related Illicit Financial Flows, tax avoidance and tax evasion  

The Africa Group supported a stronger and more action-oriented Article 7, arguing that tax-related illicit financial flows (IFFs) represent a major obstacle to domestic resource mobilisation and sustainable development, particularly in Africa. Africa countries sought to strengthen Parties’ obligations by replacing language of cooperation with binding commitments to develop and implement measures to combat tax-related IFFs, while retaining references to both tax avoidance and tax evasion within the scope of the article. Countries supporting this position included Algeria, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Replace “shall cooperate” with stronger implementation obligations 

The Africa Group argued that the current wording weakened States’ commitments. Zambia representing the Africa Group proposed replacing: “States Parties shall cooperate…” with: “States Parties shall develop and implement measures to combat tax-related illicit financial flows…” The Africa Group also proposed restructuring Article 7 into two paragraphs, separating obligations to combat IFFs from provisions safeguarding the taxing rights of affected jurisdictions.  Algeria, Senegal, Kenya and Tanzania supported this stronger implementation language. 

2. Retain references to tax avoidance and tax evasion 

Senegal argued that tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax-related IFFs are closely connected. While the concepts do not always overlap, there is a clear correlation between them, and they should remain within the scope of Article 7 rather than being removed. Nigeria argued that illicit conduct should not be interpreted solely as illegal conduct. It noted that tax avoidance, although often lawful, may still be considered illicit in a broader sense because it undermines tax justice and domestic resource mobilisation. Nigeria cited the OECD BEPS project as evidence that international tax reform has increasingly sought to address aggressive tax avoidance, even though such avoidance is legal. 

3. Strengthen commitments to preserve source taxing rights 

The Africa Group emphasised that jurisdictions affected by tax-related IFFs should retain the right to collect taxes that have been lost through such flows. It proposed additional language providing that measures adopted under Article 7 should ensure that countries whose tax base has been reduced retain the right to collect the relevant taxes. Algeria supported strengthening the taxing rights of source jurisdictions and argued that legal arrangements that undermine domestic tax bases should also be addressed. 

4. Broaden the definition of tax-related IFFs 

The Africa Group supported retaining a broad definition. It agreed with the proposed definition but opposed excluding certain non-tax crimes that ultimately have tax consequences, such as smuggling. Nigeria similarly argued that excluding non-tax crimes was inappropriate because criminal activities generating taxable income may also produce tax liabilities that should fall within the Convention’s scope. 

5. Tax-related IFFs are a major development challenge for Africa 

Africa countries consistently linked Article 7 to domestic resource mobilisation. Algeria noted that Africa loses roughly US$100 billion annually to illicit financial flows and argued that Article 7, therefore, requires binding obligations rather than merely cooperative language. Nigeria described Article 7 as one of the Convention’s most important provisions for developing countries because only multilateral cooperation can effectively combat tax-related IFFs. 

Diverging views from other Member States 

Most other delegations supported international cooperation to address tax-related illicit financial flows but diverged from the Africa Group on several key issues, including the definition of tax-related IFFs, the treatment of tax avoidance, the level of obligation under Article 7, and the role of existing international cooperation mechanisms. A significant number of countries, including Czechia, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Poland, Belgium, Ireland, Japan, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Denmark and Estonia, argued that tax avoidance and tax evasion are legally distinct concepts and cannot both be characterised as illicit financial flows. They maintained that only unlawful conduct should fall within the definition of illicit financial flows, warning that including tax avoidance could create legal uncertainty, conflict with domestic legal frameworks and potentially require the criminalisation of conduct that is lawful in many jurisdictions.  

Several delegations, including Portugal, Israel, France, Jamaica, Estonia, Italy and the Netherlands, also questioned the proposed definition of tax-related IFFs, describing it as unclear and calling for explanatory notes or further discussions to establish a common understanding before finalising Article 7. With respect to the level of obligation, Austria, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland supported retaining the formulation “shall cooperate,” considering it more appropriate for a framework convention than stronger implementation language.  

On implementation, Norway argued that Article 7 should focus on practical cooperation tools, such as exchange of information and mutual administrative assistance, rather than adopting a broad legal definition of tax-related IFFs, while Austria proposed deleting references to exchange of information from Article 7 on the basis that these issues are already addressed elsewhere in the Convention.  

Several countries also favoured narrowing the scope of tax avoidance, with Azerbaijan proposing that only abusive or artificial arrangements be covered, Singapore arguing that definitions should be tailored to a legal instrument rather than broader statistical concepts, and Brazil proposing that tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax-related IFFs be treated as separate concepts, rather than as concepts that encompass one another. 

Finally, many delegations, including Mexico, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France and Jamaica, considered the drafting insufficiently clear and supported further negotiations, including informal consultations and explanatory notes, to clarify the intended scope and operation of Article 7 before its finalisation. 

Conclusion  

The central disagreement concerned the legal scope of tax-related illicit financial flows and the level of commitment required under Article 7. The Africa Group viewed Article 7 as a cornerstone of the Convention’s efforts to combat illicit financial flows and protect developing countries’ tax bases. It advocated for stronger obligations requiring States Parties to develop and implement measures, retain references to tax avoidance and tax evasion, adopt a broad understanding of illicit financial flows, and ensure that jurisdictions affected by these flows retain their taxing rights. 

Many developed and other countries supported enhanced international cooperation but argued that tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax-related illicit financial flows are distinct legal concepts that should not be conflated. They favoured clearer definitions, reliance on existing international cooperation mechanisms, and a high-level framework that avoids creating uncertainty or conflicting with domestic legal systems. 

For further reading on this topic, please read our blog: 

Fair allocation of taxing rights: advancing source-based taxation in Africa 

05 August 2026, New York 

Harmful tax practices (Art. 8)  

Africa Group’s position on Harmful Tax Practices  

Overall, the Africa Group strongly supported retaining Article 8 but argued that it should impose stronger and more action-oriented obligations on States Parties to identify, monitor and eliminate harmful tax practices. African countries also maintained that the Conference of the Parties (COP) should play a central role in developing common principles and criteria for identifying harmful tax practices, rather than relying on standards developed in other international fora. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Strengthen States’ obligations 

The Africa Group argued that Article 8 should move beyond exploration towards binding commitments. Zambia, on behalf of the Africa Group, welcomed improvements to the revised draft but argued that States Parties should commit to eliminating harmful tax practices, rather than merely identifying and deterring them. It proposed replacing “shall explore appropriate measures” with stronger language requiring States Parties to develop, enhance, and implement effective measures to combat harmful tax practices. Mauritius argued that Article 8 should focus not only on identifying harmful tax practices but also on eliminating them and neutralising their effects on profit shifting and base erosion. Kenya, Tanzania, and Algeria supported replacing “explore” with stronger implementation language. 

2. Confer a central role on the Conference of the Parties (COP) 

The Africa Group proposed that the COP should establish the criteria for identifying harmful tax practices; determine standards for effective taxation; monitor implementation; and guide future measures under Article 8. Zambia argued that this would ensure consistency and clarity in applying the Convention. Mauritius, Kenya, and Tanzania echoed this proposal. 

3. Develop universal rather than regional standards 

African countries opposed references to “regional” cooperation, arguing that harmful tax practices should be addressed through universally agreed international standards developed under the Convention. Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and the African Union all supported deleting references to “regional” cooperation. 

4. Do not incorporate standards developed in other fora 

A central Africa Group position was that Article 8 should not explicitly recognise or incorporate standards developed in other international fora. Nigeria argued that many countries had not participated in the development of existing international standards and that the Terms of Reference do not require the Convention to adopt those standards. Zambia similarly argued that existing work may inform negotiations but should not be expressly endorsed in Article 8. South Africa, Ghana, and India supported this position. 

5. Existing frameworks have not adequately addressed harmful tax practices 

African countries argued that current international mechanisms have not effectively resolved the challenges faced by developing countries. South Africa stressed that the Convention should produce universally accepted standards developed through an inclusive UN process rather than relying on existing arrangements that lack universal participation. Ghana similarly argued that previous frameworks had failed to adequately address harmful tax practices. 

Diverging views from other Member States 

Other delegations supported international cooperation to address harmful tax practices but argued that Article 8 should remain a high-level framework that builds upon existing international standards rather than creating new or parallel mechanisms. They emphasised legal certainty, coherence with existing frameworks, and avoiding duplication of work undertaken in other international fora. 

1. Build on existing international frameworks 

Many delegations argued that Article 8 should explicitly recognise work already undertaken in other international fora and avoid duplicating existing standards. Thailand, Austria, the UAE, Israel, Belgium, Singapore, Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, Peru, the Republic of Korea, France, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, and Azerbaijan all stressed the importance of coherence with existing international mechanisms. They argued that creating separate standards under the Convention could result in inconsistent classifications, increased administrative burden, and reduced legal certainty. Several countries proposed that the Convention should identify and address remaining gaps while preserving and building upon existing work rather than starting anew. 

2. Retain high-level obligations 

Several delegations preferred to maintain the flexible language reflected in the text, using terms such as “cooperation”, rather than impose binding implementation obligations. The UAE, Norway, and Switzerland supported retaining wording such as “shall cooperate” and “shall explore,” arguing that operational measures should instead be developed through future protocols. Norway further maintained that Article 8 should express a general commitment to cooperate and enhance existing measures rather than mandate new obligations. 

3. Clarify or define harmful tax practices 

A number of countries argued that the Convention should either provide a clearer definition of harmful tax practices or establish objective criteria before imposing obligations. Czechia, Russia, Jamaica, Azerbaijan, France, and Japan all questioned the absence of clear criteria or definitions. Russia advocated transparent, objective, and universally agreed criteria developed under the United Nations, while Azerbaijan proposed that assessments should consider factors such as lack of transparency, artificial profit shifting, and erosion of another jurisdiction’s tax base. Jamaica similarly argued that accountability requires a common definition, whereas France called for clarification to avoid duplication and inconsistent norms. 

4. Preserve national tax sovereignty and policy space 

Some delegations emphasised that Article 8 should not undermine States’ sovereign right to design their own tax systems. Norway, Azerbaijan, and Honduras argued that cooperation to combat harmful tax practices should respect national tax sovereignty and allow countries to determine their own tax policies while pursuing common objectives. Azerbaijan further stressed that legitimate tax planning and development-oriented tax incentives should not automatically be classified as harmful. 

5. Avoid duplication and unnecessary operational detail 

Several countries considered Article 8 too operational for a framework convention. Austria proposed that detailed implementation measures belong in a protocol rather than the Convention itself. Thailand, Israel, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Sweden and the Republic of Korea similarly cautioned against creating parallel assessment mechanisms and argued that the Convention should complement, rather than duplicate, existing international initiatives. 

6. Allow flexibility for future development 

Some delegations supported keeping Article 8 broad and adaptable. Brazil opposed defining harmful tax practices at this stage, arguing that a rigid definition could prevent the Convention from responding to future developments. India similarly cautioned against simply reproducing existing standards, suggesting that future protocols should establish objective conditions for identifying harmful tax practices while allowing the Convention to evolve. 

Conclusion  

The principal disagreement concerned whether Article 8 should establish a new, inclusive UN-led framework for identifying and eliminating harmful tax practices or primarily build upon existing international standards. 

The Africa Group argued that Article 8 should impose binding obligations requiring States Parties to develop, implement and monitor measures to eliminate harmful tax practices, with the COP empowered to establish objective criteria and oversee implementation. African countries opposed explicit references to standards developed in other international fora, arguing that many developing countries had not participated meaningfully in their formulation and that the Convention should instead create universally agreed standards through an inclusive UN process. 

Many developed and other countries supported international cooperation but maintained that Article 8 should complement rather than duplicate existing international frameworks. They favoured retaining flexible cooperation language, preserving legal certainty, recognising prior work undertaken in other fora, respecting national tax sovereignty, and leaving detailed implementation and operational measures to future protocols or subsidiary instruments. 

Prevention and resolution of tax disputes (Art.9)  

Africa Group Position on Prevention and Resolution of Tax Disputes 

The Africa Group approached Article 9 with a clear objective: to strengthen it from a largely aspirational provision into a robust, operational commitment that can underpin effective dispute prevention and resolution across the Convention. Rather than treating the article as a placeholder pending Protocol 2, the Group pushed for stronger obligations, a clearer structure, and an explicit legal link to future implementing instruments, reflecting a broader African priority to ensure the Framework Convention delivers substantive, binding outcomes rather than deferring key commitments to later negotiation. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Overall support for Article 9 as the anchor for Protocol 2 

African countries broadly supported Article 9, viewing it as the foundational provision anchoring the future work under Protocol 2 on dispute prevention and resolution. 

2. Removing qualifying language on “needs, capacities and priorities” 

Speaking for the African Group, Zambia proposed removing the qualifying language that limited States Parties’ obligations to their “needs, capacities and priorities,” arguing this weakened the commitment. Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon, Tanzania, and the African Union (AU) all aligned with this position. 

3. Restructuring the article into three paragraphs 

The Africa Group proposed reorganising Article 9 as follows: 

• A commitment to take effective measures to prevent and resolve tax disputes in a timely manner 
• A requirement for States Parties to minimise disputes through clear legislation, accessible guidance and fair dispute resolution mechanisms 
• A provision mandating the development of future guidance, protocols or other legal instruments to implement the article 

4. Strengthening dispute resolution mechanisms 

Nigeria and Kenya proposed that dispute resolution mechanisms should be “fair, transparent, independent, accessible and effective.” The AU specifically supported adding “transparent” to paragraph 2(b). 

5. Clarifying the scope of disputes covered 

Kenya, Cameroon and India proposed clarifying that the article concerns cross-border tax disputes.  

6. Linking the article to Protocol 2 

The Africa Group emphasised that timely dispute resolution benefits both tax administrations and taxpayers, and proposed a third paragraph explicitly linking Article 9 to Protocol 2 to ensure future operational rules would be developed there. 

7. Overall objective 

African countries sought a more operational, action-oriented and legally robust article that would provide a stronger legal foundation for future dispute prevention and resolution rules, rather than a purely aspirational provision. 

Diverging views from other Member States 

While most delegations supported the objective of preventing and resolving tax disputes, they differed from the Africa Group on several key issues. 

1. Scope of Tax Disputes 

Several countries argued that Article 9 should clearly specify whether it applies to cross-border or domestic disputes, as the current drafting lacked sufficient clarity. Countries expressing this view: India, Singapore, Czechia, Norway, Austria, Russia, Israel, Estonia, Belgium, Brazil and United Kingdom  

2. Level of Commitments and Operational Detail 

Many delegations argued that Article 9 should remain a high-level framework provision and should not contain operational requirements. They preferred detailed dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms to be negotiated under Protocol 2 rather than incorporated into the Framework Convention. Countries expressing this view: Czechia, Belgium, Norway, Austria, United Kingdom, and United Arab Emirates.  

3. Relationship between Article 9 and Protocol 2 

Several countries agreed that Article 9 should serve as an anchor for Protocol 2, but called for greater clarity on how the two instruments would interact and whether certain provisions should instead be addressed exclusively in the Protocol. Countries expressing this view: Czechia, Austria, Israel, Russia, Belgium, Brazil, and United Arab Emirates.  

4. Flexibility for States Parties 

Some delegations favoured retaining references to “needs, capacities and priorities,” arguing that these provide necessary flexibility for implementation and ensure consistency with the optional approach envisaged under Protocol 2. Countries expressing this view: Germany and United Arab Emirates.  

5. Requests for Further Clarification 

Several delegations requested further clarification before finalising Article 9, particularly regarding the legal obligations created by the article, its interaction with Protocol 2 and Article 22, and the responsibilities of States Parties in implementing dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms. Countries expressing this view: United Kingdom, Norway, Israel, Estonia, and United Arab Emirates.  

Conclusion  

Overall, the Africa Group sought to transform Article 9 into a stronger, more operational and legally binding foundation for dispute prevention and resolution, pushing to remove flexibility-based qualifiers, restructure the article into clearer obligations, and explicitly anchor it to Protocol 2, while most other delegations favoured a more cautious, high-level approach that limits operational detail within the Framework Convention, preserves flexibility for States with differing capacities, and defers substantive mechanisms to Protocol 2.  Several countries also sought greater clarity on the article’s scope and its precise legal relationship to Protocol 2 and Article 22 before finalisation. Reconciling this tension between binding, action-oriented commitments and a flexible, deferential framework will remain central to future negotiations on Article 9. 

Mutual administrative assistance (Art.10)  

Africa Group’s position on Mutual Administrative Assistance  

The Africa Group approached Article 10 as a cornerstone of the Convention, viewing mutual administrative assistance not as a procedural add-on but as a core pillar of effective international tax cooperation. Across the negotiations, the Group pushed to convert loosely worded commitments into binding obligations, ensure that barriers to cooperation are actively removed rather than merely catalogued, and establish a common legal framework capable of achieving the universal participation that existing instruments have failed to secure. This reflected a broader African priority: ensuring that mutual administrative assistance under the Convention translates into real, enforceable cooperation rather than aspirational language. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Overall support for Article 10 as a core pillar of cooperation 

African countries strongly supported the inclusion of Article 10, viewing mutual administrative assistance (MAA) as an essential mechanism for implementing the Convention and a core pillar of effective international tax cooperation. 

2. Strengthening commitment language 

Speaking for the African Group, Zambia proposed replacing “shall cooperate to promote” with “shall promote” mutual administrative assistance to create a stronger obligation. Cameroon went further, proposing that States Parties commit to participating in and implementing MAA rather than merely cooperating to promote it. Mauritius proposed requiring States Parties to “extend to each other” mutual administrative assistance. 

3. Creating a separate paragraph on future guidance and protocols 

The Africa Group proposed a distinct third paragraph mandating the development of future guidance, protocols, and other legal instruments to implement the article, rather than folding these references into paragraph 1. Morocco and Senegal both supported this approach, with Morocco arguing that the role of future protocols should not be limited to procedural matters. 

4. Retaining a non-exhaustive list of forms of assistance 

The Africa Group supported the indicative list of forms of mutual administrative assistance while suggesting the article could explicitly recognise its relationship with the Exchange of Information article. Morocco and Mauritius specifically supported keeping the list non-exhaustive. 

5. Requiring elimination, not just identification, of barriers 

The Africa Group argued that paragraph 2 should require States Parties to not only identify, but to also eliminate barriers to mutual administrative assistance, removing the qualifying phrase “if and as appropriate.” Algeria, Kenya and Mauritius reinforced this position. 

6. Strengthening domestic implementation 

Cameroon proposed expanding the article to require States Parties to adjust domestic legislation to facilitate MAA and ensure effective implementation of domestic tax laws, tax administration and efforts to combat illicit financial flows. 

7. Establishing a universal legal framework 

Nigeria emphasised that MAA is indispensable for effective international tax cooperation and argued the Convention should provide a common legal framework capable of bringing all States together, rather than relying solely on existing instruments lacking universal participation. Senegal similarly argued the Convention should establish a legal foundation for strengthening implementation and addressing weaknesses in existing arrangements. 

8. Overall objective 

African countries advocated for a stronger, more legally robust Article 10 that would establish binding commitments, require the removal (not merely identification) of barriers to cooperation, and provide a clear legal basis for developing future protocols and implementation mechanisms. 

Diverging views from other Member States 

Other delegations supported the objective of strengthening mutual administrative assistance but differed from the Africa Group on several key issues, including the relationship between Article 10 and existing international instruments, the level of obligation created by the article, the extent of operational detail appropriate for the Framework Convention, and whether reservations should be permitted. 

1. Relationship with Existing International Instruments 

Many delegations argued that Article 10 should complement, rather than duplicate or replace, existing international instruments such as the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. The United Kingdom, Germany, France, Singapore, Denmark, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, Estonia and Norway stressed that the Convention should build upon existing mechanisms and clearly explain how Article 10 would interact with current legal frameworks. Several cautioned against creating parallel obligations or requiring States to revisit existing treaty arrangements. 

2. Limiting Operational Detail in the Framework Convention 

A significant number of delegations argued that Article 10 should contain only broad principles, with detailed forms of mutual administrative assistance negotiated through future protocols. Austria, Sweden, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Singapore and France considered the detailed list of forms of assistance in paragraph 1 to be overly prescriptive. Many proposed deleting the list altogether, replacing it with a general commitment, or transferring it to a future protocol. 

3. Reservations and Flexibility for States 

Several countries argued that the Convention should allow reservations to Article 10 because constitutional, legal and administrative constraints prevent some States from implementing every form of mutual administrative assistance. Switzerland led this position, arguing that some obligations conflict with domestic constitutional requirements and that reservations would be indispensable for participation. This view was supported by Israel, Czechia, Austria, Estonia, Belgium, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Cambodia, all of which argued that flexibility is necessary to ensure broad participation and preserve the optional nature of future protocols. 

4. Clarifying the Scope and Legal Effect of Paragraph 1 

Many delegations questioned whether the list of forms of mutual administrative assistance in paragraph 1 creates mandatory obligations. Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Morocco, Norway, China and Russia argued that the current drafting is unclear and that the list should either be expressly non-exhaustive by using language such as “may include” or substantially simplified. China also warned that some forms of assistance listed may not be legally or practically feasible under domestic laws in all jurisdictions. 

5. Clarifying and Narrowing Paragraph 2 

Several delegations supported the objective of identifying barriers to mutual administrative assistance but requested greater clarity regarding the nature of those barriers and the obligations imposed on States Parties. France questioned the meaning of the reference to barriers and suggested deleting the paragraph if its purpose could not be clarified. Norway requested concrete examples of the legal, practical or technical barriers the article seeks to address, while Japan cautioned that safeguards such as confidentiality, data protection and information security should not be characterised as barriers to cooperation. Brazil supported simplifying paragraph 2 by requiring States Parties to “identify and eliminate barriers,” while Austria regarded the collection of information on barriers as an important component of future work. 

Conclusion  

Overall, while there was broad agreement on the importance of mutual administrative assistance, most non-African delegations preferred a more flexible, high-level framework that complements existing international arrangements, limits detailed obligations within the Convention itself, and preserves States’ ability to make reservations or to implement different forms of cooperation through future protocols. 

Exchange of Information (Art. 11) 

Africa Group’s position on Exchange of Information (EOI)  

The Africa Group approached Article 11 as a non-negotiable pillar of the Convention, firmly resisting proposals to delete the article and instead defending its place as a standalone provision essential to implementing key substantive commitments, from taxation of high-net-worth individuals to combating illicit financial flows. Rather than treating the article’s technical density as a reason for removal, the Group sought to preserve its core while simplifying its drafting, deferring detailed operational and capacity-related questions to future protocols and COP guidance. This reflected a broader African priority: ensuring exchange of information remains firmly anchored in the Convention itself, rather than being diluted or postponed indefinitely to later instruments.  

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Strong support for retaining Article 11 as a standalone provision 

The Africa Group strongly supported the inclusion of Article 11, viewing exchange of information as a fundamental pillar of international tax cooperation and an essential mechanism for implementing other substantive provisions of the Convention, particularly those relating to high-net-worth individuals, tax-related illicit financial flows, and other commitments requiring cross-border tax information. 

2. Opposition to deleting the article 

Speaking for the African Group, Zambia rejected proposals to delete the article, arguing that EOI had already been embedded across multiple articles and that consolidating these references into a standalone provision would improve the Convention’s coherence rather than expand its scope. Nigeria argued that EOI is indispensable for modern tax administration and necessary for effectively implementing Articles 6 and 7. While recognising that certain provisions required refinement, Nigeria maintained that the solution was to improve the drafting rather than delete the article and proposed broadening the permitted use of exchanged information while avoiding unnecessarily restrictive language. 

3. Acknowledging the need to simplify drafting 

The Africa Group acknowledged that the current drafting was overly detailed and could be refined but maintained that the article itself should be retained rather than removed. 

4. Deferring operational detail to future protocols or the COP 

The Africa Group proposed that detailed operational issues, including the concept of “foreseeable relevance” and the development of technical criteria, be addressed through future protocols or by the Conference of the Parties (COP), rather than being fully elaborated in the Convention itself. 

5. Reframing capacity constraints as a matter for COP guidance 

The Group proposed revising paragraph 6 so that capacity constraints of developing countries would be addressed through guidance from the COP, rather than being framed as inherent limitations on implementation. 

7. Overall objective 

The African position reflected broad support for retaining a standalone EOI article while simplifying its drafting, addressing capacity concerns through COP guidance rather than built-in limitations, and leaving detailed operational and technical matters to future instruments. 

Diverging views from other Member States 

Most other delegations acknowledged that exchange of information is essential for international tax cooperation but differed significantly from the Africa Group regarding the appropriate place and level of detail of Article 11. Their concerns centered on whether a standalone EOI article belonged in a framework convention, the degree of legal obligation it imposed, its relationship with existing international standards, and the need for confidentiality safeguards. 

1. Deleting Article 11 and moving EOI to future protocols 

A large group of countries argued that Article 11 was too detailed and operational for a framework convention and should either be deleted or incorporated into future protocols. Countries expressing this view included Austria, Poland, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Ireland, and Israel.   

These delegations argued that Article 10 on Mutual Administrative Assistance already provides an appropriate high-level commitment to exchange information and that the operational rules governing EOI should instead be negotiated through future protocols. 

2. Retaining only high-level commitments 

Several countries supported maintaining a standalone article but argued that it should contain only broad principles, not detailed operational obligations. Countries supporting this approach included: India, Brazil, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Belgium, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Switzerland.   These delegations supported simplifying Article 11 so that it serves as a general commitment to exchange information while leaving technical rules, procedures and implementation mechanisms to protocols or future instruments. 

3. Consistency with existing international frameworks 

Many delegations stressed that Article 11 should complement rather than duplicate existing international exchange of information mechanisms, particularly those already operating through the Global Forum and other established frameworks. Countries expressing this position included: the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Switzerland, and Israel.   

These countries argued that the Convention should build upon existing standards rather than create parallel or potentially conflicting regimes for the exchange of information. 

4. Retaining the “foreseeable relevance” standard 

Several delegations supported maintaining the internationally recognised standard that exchanged information must be “foreseeably relevant” for tax purposes. Countries supporting this approach included: Indonesia, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Czechia.   

These countries argued that the standard protects against speculative or overly broad information requests while ensuring that exchange of information remains legitimate and proportionate. 

5. Calls for stronger safeguards and flexibility 

A number of delegations argued that, if Article 11 is retained, it should contain stronger safeguards relating to confidentiality, data protection, and reservations. Countries expressing this position included: United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Norway and Israel.  

Conclusion  

Overall, the Africa Group pushed for retaining Article 11 as a standalone, legally embedded provision, arguing that exchange of information is indispensable to implementing the Convention’s substantive commitments.  They were amenable towards deferring technical detail such as “foreseeable relevance” and capacity considerations to future protocols or COP guidance. Most other delegations, by contrast, questioned whether a standalone article belonged in a framework convention at all, favouring either its deletion in favour of future protocols or a simplified, high-level commitment that avoids duplicating existing mechanisms like the Global Forum, while several also called for stronger confidentiality and data protection safeguards. Thus, the existence of a commitment on EOI as a standalone article, the appropriate level of detail, and the relationship to existing frameworks continue to be the central points of divergence on Article 11. 

For further reading on this topic, please read our blog: 

Tapping into the potential of public country-by-country reporting for African countries 

EOI in Africa: More than a Simple Tool — A Strong Safeguard for Effective Taxing Rights 

6 August 2026, New York  

Capacity building and technical assistance (Art. 12)  

Africa Group’s position on Conference of the State Parties  

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Capacity Building as Essential to Implementing the Convention 

The Africa Group strongly supported the inclusion of Article 12, viewing capacity building and technical assistance as essential to enabling developing countries to implement the Convention, fulfil their tax cooperation obligations and strengthen domestic resource mobilisation. Speaking on behalf of the African Group, Kenya supported the provision as an important mechanism for enabling countries to meet their obligations under the Convention and on domestic resource mobilisation. The Africa Group also stressed the importance of institutional support and technical assistance, while calling for the provision to specifically address the needs of developing countries.  

2. Extending Capacity Building to the Protocols 

The Africa Group considered the scope of Article 12 too narrow and called for capacity building to extend beyond implementation of the Framework Convention to include the future protocols. Kenya, on behalf of the African Group, specifically raised concern that the current draft did not adequately cover capacity building required to implement the protocols. This would ensure that capacity-building provisions would not need to be repeatedly included in each protocol.  

3. Demand-Driven but Broad and Flexible Capacity Building 

African stakeholders supported a demand-driven approach to capacity building, while cautioning against drafting the Convention so narrowly that assistance could be provided only upon specific request.  

4. Mobilisation of Resources and Institutional Support 

African countries emphasised that capacity building requires more than technical training. Algeria similarly argued that the article should establish clearer procedures and standards for accessing capacity building and questioned whether the existing bilateral approach would be sufficient. Algeria proposed a stronger role for the Convention’s Secretariat in facilitating and supporting capacity-building cooperation.  

5. Clarifying Accountability and Implementation 

Morocco supported the African Group’s position and sought clarification of the reference to “drive accountability in mobilising resources,” indicating that the current wording was not sufficiently clear and could extend beyond the mandate of the provision.  

Diverging views from other Member States 

1. Capacity Building Should Remain Demand-Driven and Voluntary 

Several countries supported capacity building in principle but argued that technical assistance should be provided on a voluntary, demand-driven or request-based basis. Czechia proposed adding “and on a voluntary basis” to paragraph 2, while Brazil argued that States should be able to provide assistance “upon request or upon need.” Singapore similarly supported language providing that technical assistance should be provided upon request and according to the capacity of the assisting State.  

China also expressed concern about treating technical assistance as a mandatory obligation, particularly because of the use of “shall” in paragraph 2 and supported providing assistance upon request.  

2. Avoiding Overly Prescriptive Obligations 

Norway, India and Japan supported capacity building but considered parts of Article 12 too operational or prescriptive for a Framework Convention. Norway proposed a more concise provision that would establish the general scope of capacity building while allowing States to determine the appropriate approach. India questioned whether paragraphs 3 and 4 were necessary because they appeared too operational. Japan similarly supported avoiding detailed lists of areas of assistance and instead emphasised broad coordination among existing capacity-building providers.  

3. Use of Existing Capacity-Building Mechanisms and Avoiding Duplication 

 Several countries stressed the need to coordinate Article 12 with existing bilateral, regional, and multilateral capacity-building initiatives. Norway argued that assistance should build on existing arrangements, while Germany emphasised that capacity development should remain demand-driven, well coordinated and based on existing international and regional initiatives to maximise efficiency and avoid duplication. Japan similarly called for greater coordination with existing organisations providing technical expertise.  

4. Different Views on the Role of States as Providers 

Brazil proposed that the Convention should also recognise the responsibility of States to strengthen their own domestic administrative capacity and allocate resources for this purpose. Brazil argued that capacity building should not rely exclusively on international cooperation, since countries need to invest in retaining trained personnel, technology and administrative infrastructure.  

Germany, meanwhile, stressed that financial and material assistance should remain voluntary and subject to national priorities, with the type and scope of assistance left to the discretion of supporting States, taking into account their differing capacities.  

Conclusion 

Role of the Conference of the States Parties- Some delegations considered that the Conference of the States Parties (COP/COSP) could play a role in determining approaches to capacity building over time. Norway suggested leaving room for the COP to determine approaches as needs evolve. This differs somewhat from the African position, which sought a broader legal and institutional foundation within the Convention itself for capacity building, including support for implementation of the protocols.  

Role of the Secretariat– Algeria’s proposal for a more central role for the Secretariat was not directly reflected in the interventions of most other delegations. Algeria questioned how States would access capacity-building assistance under the proposed framework and called for clearer procedures, standards and Secretariat support rather than relying primarily on bilateral arrangements.  

Overall, African countries supported a strong, inclusive and adequately resourced capacity-building framework, extending to implementation of both the Convention and its protocols. Other countries broadly supported capacity building but generally favoured a more flexible, demand-driven and voluntary approach, with greater reliance on existing mechanisms and less prescriptive obligations in the Framework Convention. 

Conference of the States Parties (Art. 13)  

Côte d’Ivoire called for greater detail on the COP’s mandate, financing, subsidiary bodies, and technical assistance. Senegal argued the COP should have strong mechanisms to implement the Convention, including binding decision-making, resource mobilisation and defined implementation mechanisms. Cameroon supported annual meetings and greater clarity on mandate and financing. Ghana supported clear rules of procedure, defined mandates, simple-majority decision-making, and stakeholder participation. Tanzania supported simple-majority decision-making and predictable financing. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

Africa Group’s position on Conference of the State Parties  

1. Strong support for the COP as the supreme governance body 

African countries strongly supported establishing the Conference of the States Parties (COP) as the central governance and implementation body of the Framework Convention. Speaking for the African Group, Kenya argued that the article should expressly recognise the COP as the supreme organ of the Convention and its protocols, with a sufficiently broad and clear mandate to ensure effective implementation. 

2. Calls for greater specificity on the COP’s functions 

The Africa Group considered the current draft too limited and called for greater detail on the COP’s functions, including its authority to oversee the implementation of the Convention and its protocols, to establish subsidiary bodies, to coordinate capacity-building and technical assistance, and to address financial resources. 

3. Support for annual meetings 

The Group supported the requirement that the COP meet at least once a year to ensure regular oversight and maintain momentum in international tax cooperation. The African Union and Cameroon reinforced this position. 

4. Decision-making by simple majority 

Kenya, speaking for the African Group, supported decision-making by simple majority, drawing on established UN procedures, while stressing the need for clear rules of procedure. Nigeria called for detailed and unambiguous provisions on decision-making, observers and participation. Ghana and Tanzania aligned with simple-majority decision-making, while Côte d’Ivoire proposed consensus as the primary rule, with qualified majority voting as a fallback. 

5. Support for stakeholder participation 

The Africa Group strongly supported the participation of civil society, private sector, international and regional organisations and other stakeholders, recognising their technical expertise and contribution to the Convention’s work. 

6. Ensuring the COP’s independence from other forums 

Zambia stressed that while the COP should consider work undertaken in other international and regional forums, this should not make the COP subordinate to those bodies. 

7. Reinforcement from the African Union  

The AU called for the COP to be expressly empowered to adopt protocols, establish subsidiary bodies and take other measures necessary to advance the Convention’s objectives, while supporting annual meetings, financial rules and stakeholder participation.  

Diverging views from other Member States 

1. Limiting the COP’s powers to facilitation, not obligation-creation 

Germany, Czechia, the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Japan, Korea, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and others emphasised that the COP should primarily facilitate implementation and cooperation and should not be able to create new substantive obligations without the express consent of States Parties. Italy, Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg were particularly concerned about the COP acquiring powers beyond those expressly accepted by States. 

2. Preference for consensus-based decision-making 

Germany, Czechia, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan, Korea, France, Ireland and Poland supported consensus as the principal or exclusive method of decision-making, arguing it would protect State sovereignty, ensure broad participation and provide legal certainty. The Netherlands suggested consensus as the priority while leaving room for alternative procedures for specific decisions, in contrast to the African Group’s preference for simple majority voting. 

3. Broad support for stakeholder participation, with some caution 

Germany, the United Kingdom, Czechia, Jamaica, Brazil, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, France and the EU strongly supported explicit provisions for civil society, NGOs, international organisations and other stakeholders to participate as observers, broadly aligning with the African position. However, Papua New Guinea emphasised that the COP should remain State-led, with stakeholders playing only an advisory and supportive role. Some countries also called for more precise rules on observer qualification and participation. 

4. Divergent views on the level of detail required 

India, Honduras, Russia and Belgium considered the governance article one area where detailed provisions were necessary, given the COP’s long-term role in determining the Convention’s functioning. Conversely, Czechia, Singapore and others favoured drawing on existing UN instruments and leaving procedural matters to the COP’s own rules of procedure. 

5. Calls for flexibility and limits on binding effect 

Saudi Arabia supported the establishment of the COP but stressed that its powers should remain flexible and that protocols should not become binding on States unless expressly ratified. Several European countries similarly insisted that the COP should remain strictly within the authority granted to it by States Parties. 

Conclusion  

African countries supported a strong, empowered COP as the supreme governance body of the Convention, calling for annual meetings, clear decision-making powers, authority over subsidiary bodies and financing, and meaningful stakeholder participation – an implementation body capable of responding to evolving tax challenges, not merely a facilitative forum. Most other delegations, while agreeing on the COP’s importance, favoured a more constrained body with clearly defined powers, unable to create substantive obligations without States’ express consent, and preferred consensus-based decision-making and greater reliance on existing UN practices to safeguard sovereignty. The central negotiating challenge is thus balancing the African Group’s push for a strong, effective implementation body against other countries’ preference for a consensual, State-controlled and legally constrained COP. 

Subsidiary bodies (Art. 14)  

Africa Group’s position on Subsidiary Bodies (SBs)   

The Africa Group approached Article 14 as a critical piece of the Convention’s implementation architecture, rather than a purely administrative afterthought. Building on its broader push for a strong, empowered COP under Article 13, the Group argued that subsidiary bodies must be substantive, purpose-built and clearly structured with named technical bodies on priority issues, defined reporting timelines, and guaranteed regional representation to ensure the Convention translates into real, operational outcomes rather than remaining dependent on future discretion. 

Morocco supported Kenya, the Africa Group and Nigeria, and raised concern that while Article 13 clarifies that rules of procedure will be established by the COP, Article 14 leaves unclear whether SBs’ procedures are meant to follow the same rules. Côte d’Ivoire supported Kenya, the Africa Group, proposing a clear distinction between a technical subsidiary body and an implementation body, arguing that a standing technical body should not be left to the COP’s discretion but should be established directly by the Convention, and that equitable representation should apply to all technical bodies. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Overall support for subsidiary bodies as a critical implementation tool 

Speaking on behalf of the Africa Group, Kenya stated that SBs  will represent a critical element in implementing the Framework Convention and argued that Article 14 needs to be expanded to reflect their importance. 

2. Strengthening the mandate and function of subsidiary bodies 

Kenya proposed that, under paragraph 1, SBs should be able to provide recommendations on actions to ensure implementation of the Framework Convention, though with wording to limit and structure this work, including through the imposition of deadlines. Nigeria supported this position and called for greater clarity and detail on the functions and roles of the SBs to be created. 

3. Reporting timelines 

Kenya proposed a reporting requirement of no later than five years. Nigeria, however, sought more clarity on what “regularly” means and what should be reported, and proposed a maximum of three years rather than five, with provision for more immediate reporting where needed. Côte d’Ivoire similarly argued that five years was too long, proposing two to three years instead, and observed that a five-year timeline would mean the first report would only arrive after ten years recommending a shorter timeframe. 

4. Establishing specific subsidiary bodies 

Kenya proposed that specific SBs be established directly under Article 14, citing examples such as tax treaties, dispute resolution and taxation of the digital economy. Nigeria reinforced this, calling for substantive SBs aligned with key Convention commitments, including dispute resolution, tax treaties, the digital economy and high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs), while allowing the COP to create further SBs, including ad hoc committees, as needed. Nigeria also sought clarity on the role of the existing UN expert committee and whether it would be treated as one of the SBs under paragraph 2. 

5. Regional and subject-matter representation 

Kenya supported regional representation and the inclusion of subject-matter experts to enhance effectiveness. Nigeria, the African Union (AU) and Papua New Guinea (aligning with Nigeria and Ghana) reinforced the need for fair regional representation across all subsidiary bodies. 

6. Institutional hierarchy and relationship to Article 13 

Kenya supported moving paragraph 3 (on rules of procedure) to Article 13, arguing this was critical, and also endorsed India’s submission. The AU aligned with Kenya, Nigeria, India and Indonesia, calling for clarity on the nature, mandate and institutional hierarchy of subsidiary bodies, stating that SBs should be under the authority of, and report to, the COP, which alone should be empowered to establish them. The AU also argued that technical working groups should be established from the outset rather than left to lengthy future consideration, without constraints on timeline. 

Diverging views from other Member States 

1. Concerns about scope, sovereignty and financial implications 

Italy raised concerns that Article 14 is too broadly formulated, both in terms of the tasks assigned to SBs and their financial implications. Italy specifically objected to language in paragraph 1 suggesting that SBs should periodically recommend actions to the COP for implementation of the Convention, arguing that the role of the COP and its SBs should be to facilitate implementation, not to review States Parties’ implementation. Italy also flagged that the decision-making process was unclear and could raise sovereignty concerns. Germany, Austria and Ireland aligned with Italy’s position, and the UK echoed similar concerns, adding that the COP should function as a high-level forum, that “as necessary” was too broad, and that decisions to create new bodies should be taken by consensus. Korea and Austria aligned with Italy, Germany and the UK, emphasising that SBs should have clearly specified mandates and welcomed additional detail on how review processes would work. 

2. Preference for a defined, tiered institutional structure 

India proposed matching the level of detail in Article 13, arguing that SBs should be standing rather than temporary, and proposed a two-level structure: working groups focused on one or two commitments feeding into an intermediate body (e.g., a standing committee, bureau or steering committee), which would in turn report to the COP for final decisions. India argued that participation should be open but rotational, rather than including all member states, to ensure efficiency. 

3. Reallocating provisions to Article 13 

Indonesia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines argued that paragraphs 2 and 3 more properly belonged under Article 13, since the authority to establish SBs is inherently a COP function, and moving these provisions would create a clearer institutional hierarchy. 

4. Advisory role and limits on binding effect 

Saudi Arabia supported establishing SBs with carefully managed advisory and recommendation roles, stressing that their outputs should not create binding obligations on States Parties that undermine what has already been established in the Framework Convention. 

5. Precision on permanence and function 

Honduras argued that the mandated functions of SBs needed greater precision, proposing that SBs under paragraph 1 be clearly defined as permanent bodies providing technical assistance rather than exercising policy-making or decision-making functions (which should remain with the COP alone), while bodies under paragraph 2 could be temporary. Honduras proposed specific wording to establish this permanence and legal certainty. 

6. Review of implementation 

Norway valued the establishment of SBs provided they have a clear purpose and demonstrated need, but sought clarification that review of Framework Convention implementation is a matter for States themselves, consistent with the Vienna Convention, rather than a function to be exercised by SBs. 

7. Geographic representation and procedural clarity 

The Philippines and Papua New Guinea supported equitable geographic representation in SBs. Papua New Guinea also proposed shortening paragraph 1, moving its second sentence to a new paragraph 2, and developing clear terms of reference and guidelines to determine the permanency of SBs. 

Conclusion 

The African Group, along with Nigeria, Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire, pushed for a more expansive and clearly structured Article 14, calling for named substantive SBs (on dispute resolution, tax treaties, the digital economy and HNWIs), shorter and more defined reporting timelines, guaranteed regional representation, and a clear institutional hierarchy placing subsidiary bodies firmly under COP authority. Most other delegations, led by Italy, the UK, Germany, Austria, Ireland and Korea, favoured a narrower, more cautious approach, seeking to: limit SBs to a facilitative and advisory role; avoid sovereignty-sensitive review functions; ensure decisions on establishing new bodies are made by consensus; and, relocate procedural and establishment provisions to Article 13 for institutional clarity. A parallel but distinct concern, raised by India, Indonesia, Singapore, and others, centred on institutional design favoring a tiered, rotational structure over universal participation to preserve efficiency. The central negotiating tension is therefore between the African Group’s push for a detailed, purpose-built network of substantive subsidiary bodies with real implementation functions and other delegations’ preference for a lean, advisory structure whose scope and authority remain tightly bound to and reviewable by the COP. 

Data collection and analysis (Art. 15) and Review and verification (Art. 16)  

Africa Group’s position on Data Collection and Analysis and Review and Verification   

Unlike its approach to earlier articles, where the Africa Group pushed for stronger and more expansive commitments, its position on Articles 15 and 16 was primarily one of caution and clarification. The Group did not oppose combining the two articles but raised concerns about ambiguous terminology, undefined standards, and the absence of clarity on who would set the rules governing data collection, reporting and review reflecting a concern that vague provisions could create open-ended obligations or burdens for developing countries. 

Nigeria reinforced and built on the Africa Group’s concerns. In paragraph 1, Nigeria sought clarity on what the article was intended to address. In paragraph 2, Nigeria noted that the provision referred to “such agreements” without clarifying which agreements were meant. In paragraph 3, in addition to the Africa Group’s comments, Nigeria observed that the wording on anonymised information could be read as suggesting that information would not be anonymised, which it did not believe was the intention. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Concerns about combining Articles 15 and 16 

Speaking for the Africa Group, Kenya noted general concerns with combining Articles 15 and 16, stating that the merger required further clarification before it could be fully supported. 

2. Lack of clarity on “international” and “common” standards in the collection and use of statistics  

Kenya questioned what was meant by references to “international standards” and “common standards,” in Article 15 asking who would be responsible for developing them. 

3. Scope of information and safeguards 

Kenya raised concerns about the scope of information to be shared under the articles and asked for clear safeguards to be specified. 

4. Need for clearer language in Article 16 

Kenya argued that Article 16 needed clearer language, particularly regarding the frequency and format of reports, and asked who would be responsible for developing these requirements. Kenya proposed that the COP be responsible for developing implementation arrangements. 

Diverging Views from Other Countries 

1. Concerns about overly broad or open-ended drafting 

Singapore argued that Article 15 was too open-ended and proposed specific qualifying language, including limiting obligations to “the extent possible” and requiring States Parties to share information in accordance with domestic laws and safeguards. Israel raised similar concerns, proposing that the article focus on anonymised official statistics rather than taxpayer-specific information, since other articles already address exchange of information. Austria echoed Singapore’s concerns and called for clarity on the nature of the commitment and the data collection process. 

2. Overlap and duplication between Articles 15, 16 and other provisions 

Germany argued that Articles 15 and 16 overlapped with each other and with other provisions, such as Article 14 on periodic assessments, and called for clearer definition to avoid excessive or duplicative burdens. Germany also argued the articles should focus on review rather than establishing normative standards, and that mere anonymisation was insufficient as a safeguard; confidentiality protections should be strengthened. 

3. Confidentiality and data protection safeguards 

China, Azerbaijan, Norway, Germany and Saudi Arabia all emphasised the need for robust confidentiality and data protection safeguards. Saudi Arabia specifically noted that confidentiality safeguards should not be limited to information covered under Article 11 (EOI) but should apply generally, consistent with its position on that article. Azerbaijan supported a database for international tax cooperation but called for defined data categories, common standards for completeness and comparability, and limits ensuring aggregation and protection of taxpayer identity. 

4. Avoiding undue burdens, particularly for developing countries 

Czechia and the UAE stressed that the Convention should not create undue burdens, with the UAE specifically noting that data-related obligations should not require additional resources from parties beyond what is already available. Saudi Arabia asked that reporting requirements be clearly scoped to avoid complex standards or undue burdens, particularly for developing countries. 

5. Requests for precedent and consistency with existing instruments 

Norway asked for examples from other conventions with similar provisions to understand what such an article could cover, and later raised a broader question about which existing instruments Parts IV and V of the Convention were drawn from, to assess consistency with UN practice. 

6. General support with minor drafting suggestions 

Brazil supported the draft with minor tweaks, proposing changes to the wording of paragraphs 2 and 3. Colombia sought greater clarity on what financial and technical tools would be required to follow up on the Convention. 

Conclusion 

While the Africa Group did not fundamentally oppose Articles 15 and 16, its intervention reinforced by Nigeria and the AU centered on resolving ambiguity: who defines “standards,” what safeguards apply, and how reporting obligations under Article 16 would be scoped and administered, with a preference for vesting this responsibility in the COP. This concern was widely shared by other delegations, including Singapore, Israel, Germany, Austria and Saudi Arabia, who similarly flagged open-ended drafting, overlapping provisions, and insufficient confidentiality safeguards, while several also stressed the importance of avoiding undue implementation burdens, particularly for developing countries. Unlike other articles where the Africa Group pushed for stronger, more binding language, its position here converged closely with the broader membership around a shared priority: achieving clarity and precision before the provisions could be finalised. 

7 August 2026 

Secretariat (Art. 17)  

Africa Group Position on Article 17 (Secretariat) 

On Article 17, the Africa Group focused on ensuring the Secretariat is properly institutionalised and equipped to serve as a genuine operational backbone for the Framework Convention not merely an administrative function established at the COP’s discretion, but a body with a defined start date, expanded responsibilities, and dedicated technical support to help developing countries meet their obligations. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Clarifying when the Secretariat is established 

Speaking for the Africa Group, Kenya noted that the current draft of paragraph 1 simply refers to the COP making arrangements for the Secretariat, without specifying when the Secretariat will actually begin operating. Kenya argued the Secretariat should be inaugurated at the first meeting of the COP. 

2. Expanding the Secretariat’s functions 

Kenya argued that the Secretariat’s functions under paragraph 2 needed to be enhanced to include communication, documentation and implementation measures. It should also provide administrative support to other bodies, such as subsidiary bodies (SBs), and support research functions. 

3. Capacity building and support for developing countries 

Kenya proposed that the Secretariat serve as the home for capacity building until other dedicated organs are established, and that it should assist developing countries in providing the information required under the Convention. 

4. Equal and balanced regional representation 

Kenya called for the Secretariat to ensure equal and balanced regional participation. 

5. Proposal for a Technical Advisory Committee 

Kenya noted that the Africa Group had submitted written input calling for the creation of a technical advisory committee, composed of 25 tax experts (five per region), which would advise the COP, Secretariat and SBs , assist in review and assessment, finalise and approve technical reports, and ensure the Secretariat’s work is evidence-based. Kenya explained that this proposal was intended to address concerns raised elsewhere, including by the UN Tax Committee, and confirmed that the Africa Group would resubmit the proposal. 

5. More clarity of drafting 

Nigeria raised clarity concerns on paragraph 3: in paragraph 3(c), which refers to preparing reports and presenting them to “the Conference,” Nigeria asked for confirmation that this refers to the COP. In paragraph 3(d), Nigeria asked for clarification on which information is being referred to. 

Diverging Views from Other Member States  

1. Preference for a lean, voluntarily funded Secretariat 

France proposed a lean secretariat, aligning with a suggestion from Germany, and argued that funding should be provided on a voluntary basis. Korea similarly called for voluntary funding arrangements and sought greater clarity on the related financial provisions in Article 18. Sweden aligned with the Netherlands, Germany, France and others on both Articles 17 and 18. 

2. Requests for clarity on the source and meaning of the text 

The Netherlands questioned where the current text originated, noting differing understandings among delegations of what had been discussed in intersessional meetings, and called for a common understanding of specific phrases, such as the reference to mobilising “all potential and existing resources.” Czechia and Estonia echoed the comments made by the Netherlands and Germany. 

3. Procedural refinements to reporting 

Singapore proposed adding “upon request” at the start of paragraph 3(c) to establish that the COP retains oversight of reports and replacing paragraph 4(d) with language drawn from the BBNJ Agreement to make reporting more timely. 

4. Expanding support to subsidiary bodies 

Indonesia supported Kenya’s proposal for a transition from an interim to a permanent secretariat, and proposed that paragraph 3(a) be revised so the Secretariat supports both the COP and any SBs established, rather than the COP alone. 

5. Detailed functional suggestions 

The DM UN Foundation suggested that arrangements adopted at the first COP could clarify interim Secretariat arrangements, including the transfer of work and funds. It proposed that under paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b), the Secretariat could support cooperation by circulating documents in advance in all UN languages and maintaining accessible materials, including on data protection; under 3(d), it could provide templates and technical guidance while remaining strictly secretarial; under 3(e), it could identify relevant work by other international organisations to reduce duplication and report to the COP; and under 3(f) and 3(g), administrative and financial matters should be governed by applicable audit and reporting procedures. 

6. General support for technical and administrative functions 

Korea supported the Secretariat providing technical and administrative support. Ireland echoed comments made by Norway and others in relation to Article 17. 

Conclusion 

The Africa Group’s position on Article 17 centered on strengthening and formalising the Secretariat’s role ensuring it is established without delay, given expanded functions covering communication, documentation, capacity building and regional balance, and supported by a dedicated technical advisory committee to ensure evidence-based work. This reflected the Group’s broader concern, evident across earlier articles, that institutional bodies must have real operational capacity rather than remaining vague or discretionary. By contrast, most other delegations including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Korea and Sweden favoured a leaner Secretariat with voluntary funding, procedural clarifications, and closer oversight by the COP, while several also sought clarity on the origins and precise meaning of the draft text. The central divergence, therefore, mirrors earlier institutional debates: the Africa Group’s push for a well-resourced, expansive Secretariat with dedicated technical support, against other countries’ preference for a modest, cost-conscious and closely COP-supervised body. 

 Financial Resources (Art. 18)  

Africa Group’s Position on Financial Resources  

On Article 18, the Africa Group took the view that the current draft was insufficient to ensure the Convention’s financial sustainability. Consistent with its broader push for a well-resourced, operational institutional architecture under Articles 13, 14 and 17, the Group called for binding language that would place a clear obligation on the COP to secure predictable and equitably distributed funding, rather than leaving financing to uncertain or purely voluntary arrangements. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Strengthening the obligation to secure funding 

Speaking for the Africa Group, Kenya argued that Article 18 was not yet strong enough and stated that the Group would support draft language creating a clear obligation on the COP to source funding. 

2. Combining mandatory and voluntary contributions 

Kenya proposed that the funding mechanism include both free contributions from Member States and required contributions from members on a clear basis, alongside other donations. 

3. Ensuring regional balance in funding arrangements 

Kenya stated that the funding mechanism should also ensure regional balance across the UN regions. 

4. Support from Senegal 

Senegal raised questions about the scope of national capacity provisions, asking for clarification on whether “private financing ….mobilised for the benefit of all Parties” referred to in paragraph 2, referred to corporations contributing part of their tax obligations. On paragraph 3, Senegal argued that provisions concerning the functions of the Secretariat should be moved to Article 13, relating to the COP. 

5. Support from Côte d’Ivoire 

Côte d’Ivoire argued that Article 18 required greater precision, noting its similarity to Article 26 of the Tobacco Convention, and warned that reliance on voluntary funding made financing unpredictable and risked leaving Convention bodies unable to function. Côte d’Ivoire indicated it would submit further written remarks. 

6. Support from the African Union 

The AU aligned with Kenya, the Africa Group, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. 

Diverging Views from Other Countries 

1. Ensuring budgetary independence from the wider UN system 

Brazil argued that funding the Convention’s budget is the responsibility of Member States and called for more detailed provisions to guarantee direct access to necessary funds. Brazil specifically opposed mixing the Convention’s budget with the broader UN budget, warning this would undermine financial stability, and proposed that the administrative budget of the COP, Secretariat and subsidiary bodies be funded through regular contributions by States Parties. 

2. Calls for clarity on funding mechanisms 

Nigeria supported Brazil’s position, noting that the article as drafted contains no provision on how Member States would actually fund Convention activities, and called for a paragraph clearly specifying the funding mechanism. Nigeria also questioned the sequencing in paragraph 3, which envisages the COP’s first session reviewing a Secretariat study raising the question of how the Secretariat could conduct such a study before it is formally established. 

3. Preference for voluntary, non-binding funding arrangements 

Germany, aligning with the UK and Brazil, sought greater clarity on funding sources but favoured supporting capacity building through voluntary financial assistance subject to national priorities, stressing that the article should not create binding funding obligations. Germany also referenced UN Rule 153 governing budgetary procedures and noted that any request for contributions in excess of assessed amounts should respect UN rules of procedure. Estonia supported Germany’s position, and Sweden aligned with Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and France on both Articles 17 and 18. 

4. Requests for clarity on the origin of the text 

The Netherlands found the clarifying questions raised by other delegations helpful, noting that it is not always clear where specific text originates from, and stressed the importance of reaching a common understanding of the provisions under discussion, drawing on intersessional work. 

5. Secretariat clarification on budgetary process 

Responding to questions from Brazil, the Netherlands and others, the Secretariat clarified that Member States, not the Secretariat, determine funding levels, and confirmed that under Rule 153, the relevant committee or General Assembly votes on and decides the budget and its use, based on proposals assessed against the Convention’s articles and protocols as a whole. 

Conclusion 

The African Group, supported by Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and the AU, pushed for a stronger, binding funding obligation on the COP, combining mandatory and voluntary contributions with guaranteed regional balance reflecting concern that reliance on voluntary funding alone would leave Convention bodies financially unstable and unable to function effectively. Brazil and Nigeria shared some of this concern for clarity and predictability, particularly around ensuring the Convention’s budget remains distinct from the broader UN budget, but most other delegations, led by Germany, the UK, Estonia and Sweden, favoured a more cautious approach centered on voluntary contributions tied to national priorities and adherence to existing UN budgetary rules. The central divergence is therefore between the African Group’s call for a predictable, binding financial mechanism capable of sustaining the Convention’s institutional architecture, and other delegations’ preference for flexible, voluntary funding arrangements that avoid new binding obligations on Member States. 

Amendments to the Convention (Art. 19) 

Africa Group’s Position on Amendments to the Convention 

Consistent with its position on Article 13, the Africa Group carried its preference for simple majority voting through to Article 19, arguing that amendments should follow the same decision-making principle as the COP itself, while ensuring that voting rights on protocol-specific amendments remain limited to the parties actually bound by that protocol. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Support for simple majority voting on amendments 

Speaking for the Africa Group, Kenya indicated that the Group would submit written input on Article 19 and confirmed its support for adopting simple majority voting for amendments. 

2. Limiting voting rights to parties to the relevant protocol 

Kenya proposed that only parties to a given protocol should be able to vote on amendments to that protocol. 

3. Support from Nigeria 

Nigeria supported the African Group’s position, noting that since it had supported simple majority voting under Article 13, the same principle should logically extend to amendments under Article 19. Nigeria also reinforced the point that where a protocol is being amended, voting should be limited to the members of that protocol. 

4. Support from the African Union 

The AU supported the interventions by Kenya (on behalf of the African Group) and Nigeria, endorsing simple majority voting for amendments and confirming that this should be limited to parties to the relevant protocol. 

5. Support from Cameroon, with a procedural question 

Cameroon supported the African Group’s position and raised an additional question on paragraph 2, asking whether review of amendments should occur in a special COP session rather than an ordinary one, and whether the reference to “ordinary sessions” implied the existence of “special sessions” that should be clarified. 

Diverging Views from Other Member States  

1. Requests for clarity on the origin of the draft language 

Norway raised a broader question about which conventions or institutions the language in Part 5 (final provisions/institutional arrangements) was drawn from, arguing this mattered for consistency with UN practice and for assessing whether provisions designed for other subject matters were suitable here. Austria and Israel echoed this request for clarity on the textual basis being used. 

2. Preference for consensus-based decision-making 

Czechia argued that Article 19 was essential to the Convention’s functioning and proposed drawing on language from other conventions, such as the BBNJ Agreement. Czechia suggested that every decision should require consensus, and that if this approach were retained, the text should recognise the need to first exhaust efforts to reach consensus. The UK strongly opposed majority-based amendment procedures, citing the sensitivity of tax matters, sovereignty, and domestic law, and argued that instruments like the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or the UNCAC do not provide relevant precedent given Member States’ tax sovereignty; the UK considered consensus the appropriate model for amendments in a tax convention. Austria, Israel and Ireland echoed the concerns raised by the UK and Czechia. Azerbaijan supported consensus, particularly where an amendment would create new tax obligations, and proposed that consensus-based amendments should only bind the states that accept them, without affecting parties that have not agreed, in accordance with their domestic procedures. 

3. Questioning inconsistency between amendment and adoption procedures 

Brazil questioned the logic of requiring consensus on amendments if the Convention itself was not adopted by consensus and asked for clarification of this inconsistency. 

4. Scope of decision-making rules 

Singapore welcomed the inclusion of decision-making rules for amendments but questioned why such rules were included here and not for other matters requiring decisions, such as the COP or financing, and reiterated a suggestion to incorporate wording from Article 47, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the BBNJ Agreement. 

5. Clarifying terminology on acceptance of amendments 

Belgium raised a specific drafting question regarding paragraph 4, which refers to parties having “accepted” an amendment 90 days after the date of receipt, and asked why other instruments use different terms such as “ratified,” “approved,” or “accepted,” seeking clarification on what is required to accept an amendment under this article. The Secretariat clarified that the text reflects the most common method by which parties accept to be bound by a treaty. Belgium maintained that the same terminology used elsewhere (e.g., Article 24, which refers to both “acceptance” and “approval”) should be applied consistently in Article 19. Czechia echoed Belgium’s concern, referencing the Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, and urged that the next draft avoid this terminological confusion. 

Conclusion 

The African Group, supported by Nigeria, the AU and Cameroon, maintained a consistent institutional position across Articles 13 and 19, advocating for simple majority voting on amendments while ensuring that protocol-specific amendments are decided only by parties to that protocol an approach designed to keep decision-making efficient and avoid granting veto power to non-parties. This stood in sharp contrast to a large bloc of delegations, including the UK, Czechia, Austria, Israel, Ireland and Azerbaijan, who strongly favoured consensus-based decision-making for amendments, citing tax sovereignty and the sensitivity of binding obligations, with Azerbaijan proposing that consensus-based amendments bind only consenting states. A separate but related set of concerns, raised by Norway, Singapore and Belgium, focused on procedural clarity and consistency including the origins of the draft text, the scope of decision-making rules across articles, and terminological consistency around “acceptance” of amendments. The central negotiating divide therefore mirrors the Article 13 debate: the African Group’s preference for efficient majority-based decision-making versus other delegations’ insistence on consensus as the appropriate safeguard for sovereignty-sensitive tax matters. 

Africa Group Position on Relation with Protocols (Art. 20)  

Africa Group’s Position on Relation with Protocols  

On Article 20, the Africa Group departed from the broad push toward optionality that dominated the discussion, instead focusing on ensuring coherence between the Convention and its protocols and on extending the amendment procedures already agreed for the Convention to future protocols. Rather than treating optionality as the central issue, the Group emphasised structural alignment, consistent obligations, and simple majority adoption of protocols. 

The following were the key positions further articulated by the Africa Group and supported by other Member States: 

1. Extending the amendment process to protocols 

Speaking on behalf of the 54 states of the African Group, Kenya stated that the amendment process established for the Convention should be extended to its protocols, and that the protocols should be implemented in accordance with and structurally aligned with the Convention. 

2. Support for simple majority adoption of protocols 

Nigeria, echoing the African Group, argued that treaties and protocols create distinct obligations, and that if a State is not a party to a protocol’s obligations, it should not be a party to its benefits. Nigeria supported adoption of protocols by simple majority. 

3. Confirming the optionality framework in paragraph 4 while ensuring consistency 

Kenya, speaking at the national level, stated that the Africa Group agreed with the current wording of paragraph 4 and shared Nigeria’s view that obligations under a protocol should not apply to states that are not party to it. Kenya also pointed to a related provision under Article 21, establishing that Convention commitments apply to the protocols and that the Convention prevails in the event of any conflict. 

4. Support from Zambia 

Zambia supported Kenya and the African Group, but expressed some confusion, aligning with Brazil’s observation that the article does not clearly address optionality, noting that paragraph 4 appears to suggest optionality without stating it explicitly. 

5. Support from South Africa 

South Africa supported Kenya’s statement on behalf of the Africa Group and the language used, suggesting the matter may be more one of drafting style than substance, and pointed to Article 37, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the UN Convention against Organized Crime as containing similar language, indicating no fundamental issue with the current wording. 

6. Support from Lesotho 

Lesotho aligned with Kenya and the African Group and suggested that concerns about optionality may stem from past experiences in other fora where countries felt compelled to join instruments that did not clearly specify whether participation was optional. 

Diverging Views from Other Countries 

1. Broad push for explicit optionality of protocols 

A large number of delegations including Singapore, Czechia, France, the UK, Austria, Germany, Norway, the UAE, Israel, Belgium, Poland, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, Spain and Portugal argued that the article should explicitly state that protocols are optional, with several requesting a clear, standalone sentence confirming that nothing in the Convention obliges States to sign protocols. Germany and the UAE noted that, while optionality was implied by the requirement to sign, this should be made clearer. Denmark and Spain specifically questioned why explicit clarifying language was not simply added, given the apparent absence of disagreement on the underlying principle. 

2. Requests for clarity on the legal status and purpose of protocols 

The UK sought greater clarity on the legal status of protocols and whether they are meant to create new legal obligations or merely operationalise existing Convention commitments, noting this clarification had been requested previously but not received. 

3. Debate over “implement” versus “supplement” 

Belgium proposed replacing “implement” with “supplement” in paragraph 1 to clarify that the protocols support, rather than form part of, the implementation of the Convention. The Netherlands supported this distinction, suggesting that the COP envisaged protocols as a way to supplement the Convention and address future topics. Brazil took a more flexible view, arguing that both “supplement” and “implement” were valid, that they could be used together, or that the article could simply state “may adopt protocols” without specifying a particular verb. 

4. Procedural process for proposing protocols 

Czechia argued that Article 20 needed a more detailed description of the process for submitting protocol proposals, suggesting the article draw on Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which requires the Secretariat to communicate the text of a proposed protocol to parties at least six months before an ordinary session. 

5. Caution on the consequences of non-signature 

Brazil cautioned that the question of whether not signing a protocol should factor into review of a State’s compliance with Convention obligations should be left for future decision, noting that some countries may not need certain protocols if their existing treaties or instruments already fulfil similar functions. India supported the balance struck by the current paragraph 4, warning that stronger optionality language could conflict with paragraph 1, and echoed Brazil’s point that non-signatory states should not be subject to review requirements tied to protocols they have not joined. 

6. Procedural suggestions for improving transparency 

Portugal suggested that, rather than lengthy explanatory statements, brief clarifying notes indicating which existing UN convention inspired specific provisions would improve both efficiency and transparency of the negotiations. 

7. Concerns about downstream implications for related articles 

Belgium linked its concerns on Article 20 to Article 16, paragraph 1, arguing that if COP decision-making processes remain unclear, the requirement to report on legislative measures “as required by COP” could create uncertainty about the consequences of not being party to a protocol; Belgium suggested this phrase could be deleted to provide greater comfort that the Framework Convention and protocols can be signed independently of one another. 

Conclusion 

The African Group’s position on Article 20 diverged from the dominant theme of the discussion: while most delegations focused heavily on explicitly enshrining the optionality of protocols, the Africa Group through Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, South Africa and Lesotho largely accepted the existing balance in paragraph 4 and instead prioritised structural coherence, proposing that the Convention’s amendment process extend to protocols and that protocols align closely with the Convention’s framework, with adoption by simple majority and no obligations flowing to non-parties. This placed the Africa Group closer to Brazil, India, and South Africa, who cautioned against over-engineering optionality language that could create tension with paragraph 1, than to the large bloc of European and other delegations who pushed for explicit, standalone confirmation that protocols are optional. The central negotiating question is therefore less about substance than emphasis: whether Article 20 should foreground protocols’ optional character through explicit language, as most delegations urged, or whether, as the Africa Group maintained, the existing structure already achieves this balance and the priority should instead be ensuring amendment procedures and institutional alignment between the Convention and its protocols. 

Relation with Other Agreements, Instruments and Domestic Law (Art. 21)  

Africa Group Position on Relation with Other Agreements, Instruments and Domestic Law  

Article 21 emerged as one of the most contested provisions in the negotiations, and the Africa Group treated it as a “load-bearing article” central to ensuring the Convention translates into real change rather than remaining an academic exercise. In sharp contrast to the large bloc of delegations calling for paragraphs 3 and 4 to be deleted or weakened, the Africa Group, joined by India, Brazil, the Philippines and a wide range of African states, pushed to preserve and strengthen these provisions, arguing they are essential to bringing existing tax treaties into conformity with the Convention’s objectives. 

1. Article 21 as a “load-bearing” provision central to implementation 

Speaking on behalf of the Africa Group, Zambia stressed that Article 21 is pivotal in determining the relationship between the Framework Convention and existing agreements, and will shape the daily reality of revenue mobilisation. Zambia argued that states that sign the Framework Convention must take the necessary steps to comply with their commitments, or the Convention risks becoming an academic exercise. 

2. Opposing deletion of paragraph 3’s first sentence while removing conditionality 

Zambia argued that the first sentence of paragraph 3 establishes a standing obligation to take progressive and meaningful steps toward alignment, while the second sentence makes this obligation conditional on a request being made and agreed to. The Africa Group proposed deleting this second sentence to avoid delay and conditionality a position echoed by the African Union, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania and Burkina Faso. 

3. Empowering the COP to set implementation timeframes 

On paragraph 4, the Africa Group proposed empowering the COP to determine the timeframe within which existing treaties should be brought into conformity with the Framework Convention, arguing that the COP is best placed to assess realities on the ground. Tanzania supported amending paragraph 4 along these lines. 

4. Rejecting the sovereignty framing used by other delegations 

Zambia directly rejected the argument that these proposals infringe sovereignty, arguing the opposite is true: the article offers parties options, since obligations can be discharged through bilateral treaties or other means, while what matters most is the destination. Zambia used the analogy that removing paragraphs 3 and 4 would be like being shown a house but forbidden to live in it. 

5. Framing the article around fairness, equity and DRM 

Kenya grounded the African Group’s position in the Convention’s founding objectives establishing a fully inclusive, fair and effective international tax system. Kenya argued that many existing tax treaties, particularly those negotiated by developing countries on unequal footing, reflect outdated, non-inclusive principles that constitute barriers to domestic resource mobilisation (DRM), and that Article 21 must ensure such treaties are addressed. Kenya supported paragraphs 3 and 4 in full and proposed strengthening the vague term “compatible” with clearer language. 

6. Legal basis: nothing novel, consistent with existing state practice 

Nigeria argued that paragraph 3 reflects nothing new, pointing to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the hierarchy of agreements, and noted that states already amend domestic law and treaties to comply with obligations under the Global Forum and Inclusive Framework. Nigeria supported deleting the second sentence of paragraph 3, after which the first sentence would establish that new agreements supersede prior ones. Senegal, Burkina Faso and others echoed that the article does not erode sovereignty but simply reflects a common, already-established approach. 

7. Broad support across African states 

Morocco, Algeria, Cameroon, Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, the AU, Tanzania, Burkina Faso and Papua New Guinea (aligning with the African position) all supported retaining and strengthening paragraphs 3 and 4, several explicitly opposing calls for their deletion. South Africa specifically stated its opposition to deleting subsections 3 and 4. Botswana said it was “encouraged” by Africa Group submissions but “troubled” by calls to delete these paragraphs. The AU, closing the debate, argued that Article 21 is the bridge between commitments made in the room and benefits eventually delivered to citizens, and requested only the removal of the final sentence of paragraph 3 (to eliminate the conditionality issue), while otherwise fully supporting the African Group’s position. 

8. Procedural and drafting refinements 

Mauritius suggested paragraph 1(a) might belong instead under the entry-into-force article and called for consistent use of “Convention” versus “Framework Convention” throughout.  

Diverging Views from Other Member States  

1. Large bloc calling for deletion or significant weakening of paragraphs 3 and 4 

A substantial group of delegations including the UAE, Czechia, Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, China, Italy, Estonia, Israel, Belgium, Liechtenstein, Japan, Singapore, the Netherlands, Korea, Spain, Ireland, Poland and Finland argued that paragraphs 3 and 4 risk infringing sovereignty by effectively requiring renegotiation of existing treaties, and called for their deletion or substantial redrafting. Several framed this as inconsistent with treaty practice, which requires mutual, voluntary agreement to renegotiate. 

2. Concerns about legal uncertainty and unclear terminology 

The UAE, Czechia, Spain and Korea flagged that terms like “compatible,” “progressive and meaningful steps,” and “undue delay” were vague and could create legal uncertainty, with Spain specifically questioning who would determine compatibility. The UK and Poland raised broader concerns about the lack of a shared understanding of the legal effect of the article and its relationship to Articles 5, 13, 20 and Protocol 1, with the UK calling for an explanatory note from the Secretariat. 

3. Protecting bilateral treaty balance and negotiation autonomy 

Singapore, China and France argued that bilateral treaties reflect carefully negotiated balances between states and should not be subject to mandatory reopening. France, aligning with the UAE, Czechia, Austria and the UK, argued the Framework Convention should not limit states’ capacity to strike their own balance in treaty negotiations. 

4. Accommodating supranational and EU law 

Austria, Germany, Belgium and Ireland called for the article to explicitly recognise supranational law, given EU member states’ obligations under EU legal frameworks. 

5. Preference for a high-level, principles-based framework convention 

Norway, Portugal, Poland and Japan argued the Framework Convention should remain a high-level instrument setting guiding principles, not a prescriptive text mandating renegotiation, warning that para 3’s approach could set problematic precedents and pose an obstacle to broad participation in the Framework Convention. 

6. Concerns about power imbalances in renegotiation 

Mexico raised a distinct concern: that paragraph 3’s renegotiation mechanism could be leveraged by developed countries against developing countries, opening the door to provisions harmful to the latter, and requested flexibility for member states to determine how to align with the Convention in accordance with their own domestic tax systems. 

7. Reporting burden concerns 

Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Korea and Papua New Guinea specifically objected to paragraph 4’s reporting requirements as creating unnecessary administrative burden, and called for a simpler, less prescriptive approach. 

8. Middle-ground and cautionary voices 

India and Brazil, while not part of the African Group, strongly supported preserving the substance of paragraphs 3 and 4, warning that deleting them would render the review mechanism a “dead letter.” Russia cautioned against “radical positions” on either side, calling for flexible compromise language that preserves the possibility of treaty review without an ironclad obligation. Honduras and Jamaica acknowledged the importance of coherence but stressed the practical, resource-intensive difficulty of renegotiating multiple treaties. 

Conclusion 

The African Group, strongly supported by India, Brazil, the Philippines and a broad coalition of African states, treated Article 21 as indispensable to ensuring the Convention has real teeth pushing to preserve the core obligation in paragraph 3, remove its conditional second sentence, and empower the COP to set concrete timeframes for aligning existing treaties under paragraph 4. This position was framed not as an infringement on sovereignty but as a natural consequence of states exercising that same sovereignty by signing the Convention in the first place. By contrast, a large and diverse bloc of mostly developed and several Asian and Gulf states including the UAE, Czechia, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, Korea and the UK viewed paragraphs 3 and 4 as a potential threat to treaty stability, legal certainty and sovereignty, pushing for their deletion or substantial softening, while raising legitimate concerns about vague terminology, reporting burdens and the article’s unclear relationship to other provisions. The central tension is therefore existential for the Convention’s effectiveness: whether Article 21 will function as a binding mechanism compelling real alignment of existing treaties with the Framework Convention’s principles, as the Africa Group insists is necessary to correct long-standing imbalances in the global tax system, or as a soft, high-level statement of intent that leaves existing treaty relationships fundamentally undisturbed, as most non-African delegations prefer. 

About the African Civil Society Working Group on the UN Tax Convention  

The Working Group comprises of African-based civil society organisations coordinated by Tax Justice Network Africa, with the aim of promoting a UN Tax Convention that promotes African interests and enables the mobilisation of resources for the delivery of public services and social and economic rights of the African people. 

For more information about the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) on the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, please contact Everlyn Muendo via  [email protected]